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ABSTRACT: Modern music theory, ignoring the problems connected with the subject’s 
auditive experience but referring to the objective laws of nature, was criticised by Carl 
Dahlhaus, although he accepted -  to a certain extent -  the hypothesis of historical 
determinism. Dahlhaus links this turning point in the history of reflection on music 
with the transition from the ‘ontological contemplation’ of the Tonsystem to the ‘aes­
thetic contemplation’ of the Tonkunstwerk, the fundamental characteristic of which is 
the idea of ‘wholeness’ (die Idee der Ganzheit).
The new conception of the discourse on the theory and history of modern music pro­
posed by Karol Berger in his book A Theory of Art (2000) bears testimony to crucial 
changes in the contemporary humanities linked to the so-called ‘cognitive revolution’. 
According to Berger, the fundamental characteristic distinguishing modern art from pre­
modern art is its autonomy. Berger distances himself from the modern tradition of theo­
retic-aesthetic discourse treating the work of art, including the work of music, as an 
axiologically neutral entity independent of ‘human nature’, that is, of the functioning of 
our memory, imagination and cognitive mechanisms, and also not having a specific so­
cial function. At the centre of Berger’s theoretical interests is aesthetics, as broadly un­
derstood, coupled with ethics and history, poetics and hermeneutics. He is not interested 
-  like Dahlhaus -  in considering ‘what art is’ or ‘what music is’ , but poses the question: 
‘What should the function of art be, if art is to have a value for us ?’
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The new conception of the discourse on the theory and history of 
modern music proposed by Karol Berger in his book A Theory o f Art1 bears 
testimony to crucial changes in the contemporary humanities linked to the so- 
called ‘cognitive revolution’ and the search for new tools for the description 
and interpretation of the phenomenon of human creative activity and the 
functioning of the products of this activity within a given community.2 The
1 Karol Berger, A Theory of Art (New York and Oxford, 2000).
2 See Albert S. Bregman, Auditory Scene Analysis: the Perceptual Organization of 
Sound (Cambridge, 1990); John A. Sloboda, The Musical Mind (Oxford, 1986); David
cognitive approach focuses on the subject, accentuates the specific nature of 
the ‘human factor’, our senses and mind, in coming to know ourselves and in 
conceptualising sensory phenomena. Modern learning about man, mean­
while, including that about music, shaped under the influence of the philoso­
phy of nature (Naturphilosophie) and the ‘scientific revolution’ linked to the 
advancement of the natural sciences, has accepted the positivist postulate of 
axiological objectivity and neutrality (indifference), positing an impersonal 
approach to scientific study. Characteristic of positivist philosophy, as Leszek 
Kolakowski writes, is ‘the radical destruction of subjectivity [...], the aban­
donment of the subject, which is now seen as an extra-cognitive construct, 
attributed illegitimately, or merely for the purposes of intellectual conven­
ience, to the content of cognition. This subjectless subjectivism attempts, 
above all, to formulate ideas of purified experience. ’3 According to modern 
learning about music, the musical work is an entity determined on one side by 
the laws of nature discovered in the natural sciences (physics and biology) 
and on the other by the ‘historical necessity’ suggested by idealist philosophy.
Modern music theory, ignoring the problems connected with the subject’s 
auditive experience but referring to the objective laws of nature, was already 
criticised by Dahlhaus,4 although he accepted -  to a certain extent -  the hy­
pothesis of historical determinism. Berger, however, decidedly breaks both 
with the positivistic paradigm of Philosophie der Natur and also with the 
idealistic concept of the history of music (or art) determined by the imper­
sonal forces of pantheistic nature and its dialectic development.
Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford, 1996); A 
Companion to Cognitive Science, eds. William Bechtel and George Graham (Oxford, 1998); 
Kognitywne podstawy języka i językoznawstwa [The cognitive foundations of language 
and linguistics], ed. Elżbieta Tabakowska (Kraków, 2001); John A. Sloboda, Exploring the 
Musical Mind. Cognition, Emotion, Ability, Function (Oxford, 2005).
3 Leszek Kolakowski, Filozofia pozytywistyczna. Od Hume’a do Kola Wiedeńskiego 
[Postivist philosophy. From Hume to the Vienna Circle] (Warsaw, 1966), 113. In musico- 
logical reflection, too, we encounter the idea of ‘experience cleansed of subjectivity’, the 
notion of the ideal work (as an intentional entity), the ideal listener (as a competent analyst 
isolated from biological cognitive conditions and cultural context) and the concept of ab­
stract ‘pure form’ or ‘pure sound’, disregarding the properties of the subject.
4 See Alicja Jarzębska, ‘Dialektyczny dyskurs Dahlhausa’ [Dahlhaus’s dialectic dis­
course], Ruch Muzyczny 53 (2009/6), 36-38; Alicja Jarzębska, Systematische Musikwis­
senschaft w ujęciu Carla Dahlhausa [Systematische Musikwissenschaft as seen by Carl 
Dahlhaus] in: Muzykolog wobec świadectw źródłowych i dokumentów. [The Musicologists 
and Source Documentary Evidence], eds. Zofia Fabiańska, Jakub Kubieniec et al. (Kraków, 
2009), 779-802.
Carl Dahlhaus’s critique of modern music 
theory
A crucial influence was exerted on modern reflection on music by 
the philosophy of nature generally understood as (animate or inanimate) mat­
ters Philosophic der Natur treated nature as the source and foundation of 
invariable and objective laws regulating the mutual relations between objects 
and the idea of the integral whole {Die Idee der Ganzheit), as variously under­
stood, and also as a force not only causing the growth of biological organisms 
but also -  according to the ideology of progress -  determining historical 
changes in the development of human thought and the principles of social 
organisation.6 Thus modern thinking about music was suspended between 
physics (acoustics), studying the stable and objective laws governing ‘sono­
rous matter’,7 and historicism, accepting the determinism of the changes in 
compositional means isolated from their social and ideological context8. Ad­
ditionally, it was bound up with the terminology of idealist philosophy and 
with the concept of a pantheistic Absolute, Schopenhauerian Will or ‘spiritual 
matter’ (Empfindungsmaterie, Geistfahigem Material). Therefore, music was 
treated either as an acoustic ‘sounding body’ (corps sonore, akustische Sub-
s A distinction of matter into ‘organic matter’ (dynamic, the source of the growth of di­
versified organisms) and ‘non-organic matter’ (stable, non-developmental) was proposed 
by Count George Leclerc de Buffon (1707-1788) in Histoire naturelle (1749)» which in the 
eighteenth century became a bestseller (in France, around 250 popular editions of this work 
were published around that time). Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the idea of an 
organic pre-substance was used by Wolfgang Goethe, who in his Versuch die Metamor­
phose der Pflanzen zu erklären (1790, pub. 1802) put forward the notions of the Urpflanz 
(pre-plant), an Urphänomen (pre-phenomenon) to which Heinrich Schenker, Arnold 
Schönberg and Arnold Webern referred, among others. See Severine Neff, ‘Schoenberg and 
Goethe. Organicism and Analysis’, in Music Theory and the Exploration of the Past, eds. 
Christopher Hatch and David W. Bernstein (Chicago, 1993), 4 0 9 _4 3 3 ! William Pastille, 
‘Music and Morphology: Goethe’s Influence on Schenker’s Thought’, in Schenker Studies 
ed. Heidi Siegel (Cambridge, 1990), 29-44.
6 Music Theory and Natural Order from the Renaissance to the Early Twentieth Cen­
tury, eds. Suzannah Clark and Alexander Rehding (Cambridge, 2001).
? A central notion in the music theory of Jean-Philippe Rameau is the corps sonore. See 
Thomas Christensen, Rameau and Musical Thought in the Enlightenment (Cambridge, 
1993).
8 In Tableau de la musique et de ses branches (i77o)> presented by the French com­
poser Nicolas-Etienne Framery (1745-1810), learning on music encompasses the acoustic 
(divided into metaphysics, physics and mathematics), the practical (understood as both the 
composing and the performance of music divided into the sacred and the secular) and the 
historical. See Carl Dahlhaus, ‘Musikwissenschaft und Systematischen Musikwissenschaft’, 
in Systematische Musikwissenschaft, Neues Handbuch der Musikwissenschaft 10, eds. Carl 
Dahlhaus and Helga de la Motte-Haber (Wiesbaden, 1982), 26.
strat) or as an ‘opus methaphysicum’, the result -  as Edward Hanslick wrote
-  of ‘the work of the spirit in material fit for the spirit’ (Arbeiten des Geistes 
in Geistfahigem Material).
The division of learning into Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft 
proposed by Wilhelm Dilthley« (1833-1911) had a crucial influence on defin­
ing the subject, aims and research methods of Musikwissenschaft as a subject 
of university study. The German philosopher held the overriding, binding 
principle in the human sciences, to which Musikwissenschaft was ascribed, to 
be thinking in terms of history, and in the name of historical change he re­
jected aesthetics which referred to supra-historical criteria for the assessment 
of artistic value (e.g. to the notion of beauty).10 Yet modern music theory con­
tinued its attempts to adapt the notions and methods of Naturwissenschaft, 
‘partly’, writes Dahlhaus, ‘for prestige, partly through its own blindness, 
which prevented it from seeing the difference between ancient and modern 
notions of nature’.11
Whilst in pre-modern times (antiquity and the Middle Ages), nature was 
associated with music understood as a synonym of harmony, cosmos (insti­
tuted by the biblical Creator) and order, which itself was associated with a 
parallel between mathematical proportions and pleasurable sensory phenom­
ena (the personal experience of pleasure that resulted from the combining of 
various sensory phenomena into a harmonious whole), in modern times 
(from the Renaissance to the close of the twentieth century), music was held 
to be ‘natural’, and the theory of music (understood as works produced by 
man) was legitimised by reference to the ‘laws of nature’ formulated in the 
natural sciences or declared by philosophers as part of Naturphilosophie.12
Dahlhaus links this turning point in the history of reflection on music with 
the transition from the ‘ontological contemplation’ of the Tonsystem (mathe­
matical proportions within the tonal system) to the ‘aesthetic contemplation’ 
of the Tonkunstwerk, the fundamental characteristic of which is the idea of 
‘unity’ or ‘wholeness’ (die Idee der Ganzheit). Although the subject of theo­
9 Wilhelm Dilthley, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. Versuch einer Grundla- 
gung für das Studium der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte (1883).
10 For example, in his introduction to a source documented edition of Denkmäler 
deutscher Tonkunst (1893), Philipp Spitta wrote: ‘To regard works of art as primary docu­
ments and to wish to exert every means for the purpose of reading and interpreting them 
correctly, above all, without regard to esthetic enjoyment, this I see as one of the most im­
portant steps forward in recent times’. Spitta, ‘Denkmäler deutscher Tonkunst’, Die 
Grenzboten. Zeitschrift für Politik, Literatur und Kunst, 52/2 (1893); cit. after Carl Dahl­
haus, Aesthetics of Music, trans. William W. Austin (Cambridge, 1982), 69 [Ger. orig. 
Musikästhetik (Cologne, 1967)].
11 See C. Dahlhaus, ‘Was heißst „Geschichte der Musiktheorie”?’, in Geschichte der Mu- 
sikheorie, ed. Frieder Zaminer (Darmstadt, 1985), vol. 1,18.
12 Music Theory and Natural Order, eds. Clark and Rehding.
retical contemplation was still the ‘nature of music’, from the point of view of 
philosophy the term ‘nature’ was understood in a distinctly different way. 
Dahlhaus emphasises the idea that this change of paradigm in European mod­
ernity was connected with the fact that
‘all the underlying principles of the ancient understanding of music theory were 
rejected [...] [since] the contemplation of the tonal system expressing the ethical 
idea of bios theoretikos ontologically rests on the premise that beyond the realm 
of the transient [...] would be hidden a realm of the invariably existing (expressing 
an objective logos, accessible to subjectivity). [...] Whilst the nature of music -  ac­
cording to the ancient conception -  was represented by a tonal system delineating 
the area of that which was sensible in musical practice, the interpretation of music 
theory as contemplation informed by natural philosophy means nothing less than 
that one regarded nature -  in strict opposition to modern natural science as de­
veloped in the seventeenth century -  as “understandable from within”. In other 
words, one was convinced that nature could be understood by “empathising”’.13
Dahlhaus also rejected the idea that the ‘laws of nature’ discovered by the 
natural sciences could determine the theory and aesthetics of music, defining 
the means employed by composers as in keeping with nature or not, and so 
proper or not. He considered that ‘between modern natural science [...] and 
the reflection on composing and compositional theory which forms the cen­
tral theme of music theory, there arises an unbridgeable gu lf.14 Dahlhaus’s 
musicological reflection is dominated by a clearly emphasised doubt as to 
whether
‘between the physical explanation of acoustic phenomena and the historical- 
hermeneutic understanding of those phenomena it is possible to sensibly construe 
a causal link, the existence of which was assumed for two hundred years. Music 
theory, irritated by the fact that the harmonic series contains only the major chord 
and not the minor chord as well, invoked for its justification a succession of new 
hypotheses. However, not for one moment did it doubt the basic premise of 
“physicalism”, that music as intentionally understood [as auditive experiences or­
dered in time, A. J.] was based on [...] physically explainable facts’.15
So Dahlhaus did not accept the hypothesis posited in modern learning 
about music of a causal relationship between natural science, focused on de­
termining the laws governing the occurrence of sensory phenomena, and mu­
sic theory, understood as reflection on the art of composing, taking account of 
some criterion of excellence and social function. But he did link freedom of
>3 Dahlhaus, ‘Was heißst „Geschichte der Musiktheorie”?’, 4-5.
Ibid., 18.
‘5 Ibid., 18-19.
artistic choice to the watchwords of the artistic avant-garde, accepting the 
concept of historical necessity and the ideology of progress. He considered 
that ‘negative elements represent the driving momentum in musical progress 
[...]. A negative that leads forward is positive.’16 The history of music as dia- 
lectically conceived, particularly that of the nineteenth and twentieth centu­
ries, was at the centre of Dahlhaus’s research interests in respect to both par­
ticular composers and their works and to methodology, as is attested by many 
of his works, including Zwischen Romantik und Moderne, Die Musik des lg. 
Jahrhunderts and Grundlagen der Musikgeschichte.17
Karol Berger’s concept of the nature of the 
musical work
According to Berger, the fundamental characteristic distinguishing 
modern art from pre-modern art is its autonomy, which obliges us to pose the 
question of the function of art, particularly of music, and at the same time 
makes it is so difficult to answer this question. As he enquires, ‘Once art has 
been emancipated from the context of social practices that gave it is signifi­
cance, what is its point? What is the function of functionless art?’ He goes on 
to consider ‘whether art still has a worthwhile role to play in our private and 
public lives’.18 Berger distances himself from the modern tradition of theo- 
retic-aesthetic discourse treating the work of art, including the work of music, 
as an axiologically neutral entity independent of ‘human nature’, that is, of 
the functioning of our memory, imagination and cognitive mechanisms, and 
also not having a specific social function.
Contrary to the modern tradition of theoretical discourse on music, Ber­
ger is also interested neither in notions from acoustics or mathematical set 
theory nor in the concept of ‘historical necessity’. The central notions in his 
considerations on the subject of art are such categories as aesthetics, poetics 
and hermeneutics, and so notions connected with the cognition and interpre­
tation of the products of man from the perspective of some model of perfec­
tion and value.19 Also understood in a new way is the notion of nature, since
16 Dahlhaus, Aesthetics of Music, 95.
17 Carl Dahlhaus, Zwischen Romantik und Moderne (Munich, 1974); Die Musik des 19. 
Jahrhunderts (Wiesbaden, 1980); Grundlagen der Musikgeschichte (Cologne, 1977).
18 Berger, A Theory of Art, 5,11. According to Berger, ‘premodern art was addressed to 
groups of people assembled for purposes other than aesthetic ones. [...] Modern art [...] is 
produced for [...] anonymous buyers [...]. It addresses not groups, but a public of isolated 
individuals, and its function is specifically aesthetic’, 5.
19 The author divided his book into two parts (aesthetics; poetics and hermeneutics), 
framed by a prologue and epilogue: Prologue: The function and value of art; part I. Aesthet­
Berger considers ‘nature’ from the point of view of our cognitive capacities 
and conditioning linked to visual (he differentiates between two- and three- 
dimensional visual phenomena) and auditive (acoustic phenomena) percep­
tion, and also of our ability to verbalise these (real or imagined) experiences, 
that is, to formulate ideas in some language that functions as an auditive 
(speech) or visual (writing) phenomenon. Thus the notion of ‘nature’ is asso­
ciated with the ‘human factor’, with the functioning of our senses (hearing, 
sight) and minds (memory, imagination) in the process of creating culture. 
‘Nature’ understood in this way is connected with ‘cultural media’, which -  
according to Berger -  have three features: (1) we do not create them, but in­
herit them, (2) they serve the representation of ourselves (the subject’s ‘inner’ 
world) or of our perception of objects (the ‘outside world’), (3) they can serve 
the encoding not only of our real experiences, but also of those only imagined. 
Thus the discourse on nature and culture proposed by Berger concentrates on 
man, on ascertaining our ‘natural’ biological conditioning and our need to 
create works of art, and so the objectivisation of the subject’s experience -  the 
communicating to others of our ‘inner world’ and our perception of the ‘out­
side world’.
At the centre of Berger’s theoretical interests is aesthetics, as broadly un­
derstood, coupled with ethics and history, poetics and hermeneutics. In the 
last century, aesthetics -  the origins of which, associated with Aleksander 
Gottlieb Baumgarter’s term ‘aesthetica’, date back to the mid eighteenth cen­
tury -  was marginalised and, according to Dahlhaus, ‘came to an end around 
1900, surrendering its constituent parts to historical studies or philosophy of 
history, to technology or psychology or sociology of art’.20 Berger, meanwhile, 
links reflection from the field of aesthetics on the purposes of art with the 
questions of poetics and hermeneutics, analysing the means which serve the 
realisation of preferred aims and considering in what way works ought to be 
interpreted. He is not interested -  like Dahlhaus -  in considering ‘what art is’ 
or ‘what music is’,21 but poses the question ‘What should the function of art 
be, if art is to have a value for us [...] if art is to be considered a worthwhile
ics: The ends of art works (1. The nature of art; 2. The uses of art; 3. The genealogy of mod­
ern European art music); II. Poetics and Hermeneutics. The contents and interpretation of 
artworks (1. Diegesis and mimesis: the poetic modes and the matter of artistic presentation; 
2. Narrative and lyric. The poetic forms and the object of artistic presentation; 3. Herme­
neutics. Interpretation.and its validity); Epilogue: The power of taste.
20 Dahlhaus, Aesthetics of Music, 2. Enrico Fubini (A History of Music Aesthetics, 
trans. Michael Hatwell (London, 1990), trans. Zbigniew Skowron as Historia estetyki mu- 
zycznej (Krakow, 1997), 520) also considered that ‘music aesthetics in the narrow sense is 
breathing its final breath, if it did not altogether cease to exist some time ago’.
21 Carl Dahlhaus and Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht, Was ist Musik? (Heinrichshofen,
1985)-
occupation?’22 He considers that in our times this is a key question; further­
more, he is convinced that ‘music represents the central features and dilem­
mas of the social and historical situation of art today in a particularly radical, 
acute, and clear fashion’.23
In Berger’s conception, the work has a sensory-mental nature: on one 
hand, it is a physical object; on the other, it is a mental object. For Berger, the 
dividing line between artworks and ordinary objects is historically variable 
and culturally conditioned. According to his theory, works produced by man 
are real ‘physical objects’ arising as a result of the encoding of the subject’s 
experience in a medium accessible to our senses, that is, as a visual or audi­
tive phenomenon. Thus works are destined to be ‘read’ by receivers from the 
point of view of their poetics, function and significance within a particular 
culture. The function of works is the objectivisation of the subject’s real or 
imagined experiences and the way he/she perceives reality. However, works 
always function within established ‘social practice’, and ‘to describe and un­
derstand a practice involves specifying the goods it attempts to make and the 
standards of excellence in terms of which such goods are evaluated’.24 Berger 
understands the notion of social practice similarly to Charles Taylor and Alas- 
dair MacIntyre:25 he links it to some standard of value.
The author of A Theory o f Art distances himself from ontological consid­
erations of the way in which a musical work exists. He does not accept Roman 
Ingarden’s concept associated with the notion of the ‘intentional entity’. He 
firmly states that ‘A musical work [...] is a real (or imagined) sounding object, 
identical with what is usually called a “performance”’,26 and so an imperma­
nent object or event. For this reason, he considers that
‘all we have and all we are ever likely to get are necessarily works-performances 
and, optionally, scores-texts. The ideal “work” is the result of a typical seduction 
by language, a concept with no useful job to do (apart from providing an enter­
taining metaphysical puzzle for professional philosophers and a shortcut for mu­
sicians)’.27
However, in the musical culture of the post-Beethoven period, with its 
clear distinction between the composer and the performer, this notion gained 
credence. Therefore, claims Berger, such ‘loose talk’ is not harmful, ‘provided 
it does not put us on a hopeless chase after this nonexistent entity, the ideal
22 Berger, A Theory of Art, 9,12.
23 Ibid., viii.
24 Ibid., 113.
25 See Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge, 1985); Alas- 
dair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, 1984).
26 Berger, A Theory of Art, 53.
27 Ibid., 54.
“work” distinct from both performances and scores’.28 It is worth stressing 
that a similar view was held by Igor Stravinsky, who in his Poetics o f Music 
distinguished two forms of existence of the musical work: (l) as a real sensory 
phenomenon that is the result of performance and (2) as an imagined rela­
tionship of sounds (including on the basis of the score).29
According to Berger, works (i.e. visual and auditive phenomena produced 
by man and the ideas encoded in them) exist to be decoded, that is, conceptu­
alised from the point of view of their aim (aesthetic), poetic (the means em­
ployed) and hermeneutics (their signification in a given culture). In his opin­
ion, their purpose is to enhance our knowledge with the experiences of other 
people and to create community. Since the function of works is the objectivi- 
sation of a person’s inner experience and the outside world perceived by 
them, we may speak of two kinds of function -  self-presentation and refer­
ence. Both these functions are fulfilled in an indirect way by works of lan­
guage and in a direct way by musical and visual works. Self-presentation, that 
is, the presentation of the subject’s ‘inner’ world (in particular, the dynamics 
of his/her emotions or ‘desires’) in a direct way, is served above all by musical 
works, whereas the function of the direct and more precise presentation of the 
objects of our interest (i.e. our perception of the ‘outside’ world) is discharged 
by visual (plastic) works.
According to Berger, what distinguishes linguistic works from visual 
(plastic) and musical works, besides the possibility of the indirect (through 
notions) presentation of both the dynamic of a subject’s ‘inner world’ and also 
the objects perceived by him/her (the ‘outside world’), is that the medium of 
language allows us to argue our aesthetic convictions and ethical opinions. 
This is because ‘a fully developed ethical life involves not only choosing both 
the aims and the means of our actions, but also justifying the most important 
choices’.30 Avant-garde art, meanwhile, gained autonomy but -  as Berger 
states -  lost, together with the other humanistic disciplines, any kind of prac­
tical justification as an element of ethical and political instruction, since the 
authority of judgment was deprived of authority and taste deprived of power.
Berger also rejects Ferdinand de Saussure’s distinction between the ab­
stract (impersonal) langue and the concrete (personal) parole, since the term 
‘language’ refers to thoughts verbally formulated by some person which may 
be transmitted through both visual (writing) and auditive (speech) media. For 
this reason, he highlights the differences between music and language, since
28 Ibid., 55.
29 ‘It is necessary to distinguish [...] two states of music: potential music and actual mu­
sic. Having been fixed on paper or retained in the memory, music exists already prior to its 
actual performance.’ Igor Stravinsky, Poetics of Music, trans. Arthur Knodel and Ingolf 
Dahl (New York, 1947), 125.
3° Berger, A Theory of Art, 74.
music is for him an exclusively auditive phenomenon, the experiencing of 
which may be conceptualised through words-notions. Thus the role of the 
sound in language and in music is decidedly different, since an understanding 
of music -  differently to an understanding of language -  is inextricably linked 
to the real or imagined experiencing of the qualities of a sound and the rela­
tions of its changes over time. The graphic fixing of the score serves -  to his 
mind -  only to assist our acoustic memory and imagination: it is derivative 
and optional, and the score is simply an instruction for the performer.
In the context of this differentiation of the ‘nature of art’ into ‘representa­
tions’ and ‘arguments’, Berger interprets its links with the ‘tools of culture’, 
such as history, art, science and philosophy. According to his theory, ‘repre­
sentations’ may concern real objects, which are dealt with above all by his­
tory, or fictional objects, which are the domain of art. ‘Arguments’, mean­
while, can refer to the world ‘as it is’, which is the object of interest of science, 
or the world as it ought to be -  that which, according to Berger, should be 
addressed by philosophy.
In his considerations of the poetics of the work of art, including the work 
of music, and its basic elements and forms, Berger takes account of the way in 
which we perceive things as figure-background and how we perceive time as 
action (narrative or dramatic) or as lyrical contemplation. He employs catego­
ries taken from literary theory, such as the voice (of the protagonist or narra­
tor), the background to events, narration and lyricism, but these distinctions 
also appear in cognitive psychology.31 In discourse on the poetics of the musi­
cal work, the notion of the ‘voice’ can be related, among other things, to a 
distinctive tonal figure called a tune, theme or harmonically-shaped melody 
(Safz), and the notion of ‘background’ may be linked to the term ‘accompani­
ment’ (Gang, in Bernhard Marx’s theory) or ‘sound layer’ (in Józef M. Cho- 
mihski’s theory).
Also drawn from literary theory are such terms as ‘narrative’ and ‘lyric’, 
but Berger understands these very broadly, relating them -  as already men­
tioned -  to our capacity for a dual experiencing of time: as action or as con­
templation. Thus the terms ‘narrative’ and ‘lyric’ serve to distinguish the two­
fold way of shaping and experiencing time: (l) as a teleological process of 
change in the quality of the sound in a musical work or (2) as the contempla­
tion of the ‘colouring of the sound’. Hence his distinction of two basic forms 
of the shaping of the musical work: the narrative form and the lyrical form. 
According to Berger, the model of perfection of the narrative form comprises
(1) a comprehensible temporal whole (with a distinctive effect of beginning,
31 Cognitive psychology regards ‘figure’ and ‘background’ as fundamental categories in 
the conceptualisation of both visual phenomena and auditive, musical, phenomena. See 
John A. Sloboda, The Musical Mind: The Cognitive Psychology of Music (London, 1985).
middle and end), (2) a suitable size (a duration of the parts and the whole 
which is easy to remember), and (3) such a configuration in which the succes­
sion of parts is deliberate, subordinated to the drive towards culmination and 
subsequent relief. The lyrical form, meanwhile, is in a way atemporal, since 
neither the duration of the successive events or tonal ‘forms’ nor their se­
quence is of essence. In Berger’s opinion, this dual way of shaping time -  the 
narrative or the lyrical mode -  inclines the receiver towards an active or 
a passive contact with music. Berger is convinced that the correlation of these 
forms reproduces the entire sphere of man’s ways of being in the world: his 
actions and his mental-emotional states. In addition, the usefulness of this 
dichotomy lies ‘in its ability to illuminate individual works and whole musical 
cultures in new and interesting ways’.32
Further categories which Berger proposes for describing the poetics of 
a musical work are ‘feelings’ and ‘moods’. He posits that ‘feelings’ constitute a 
specific mental state connected with the cognitive or volitive sphere (i.e. their 
cause is some ‘intentional object’), whilst a mood ‘represents the most funda­
mental level of mental life, a “basic disposition” (Grundverfassung) which col­
ors all of our mental states. A specific underlying mood gives all our experience 
a definite direction.’33 We do not always have some ‘feeling’, whereas we are 
always in some ‘mood’. According to Berger, the notion of mood is of funda­
mental significance in understanding ‘absolute’ instrumental music (i.e. music 
with neither text nor programme), and so the discovery that ‘moods constitute a 
layer of mental life distinct from emotions [...] allows us to blunt the counterin­
tuitive edge of Hanslick’s conclusion’,34 according to which music cannot repre­
sent the content of feeling but only the motion, which ‘is just one attribute’ of 
feeling, ‘the ingredient which music has in common with emotional states’35. 
Berger opines that vocal music can depict particular emotions, while instrumen­
tal music usually embodies a particular mood (or a scenario or succession of 
moods). The musical metaphor of ‘tuning’ is particularly apt here, and Ernst 
Theodor Amadeus ‘Hoffmann’s celebrated claim [...] that the content of instru­
mental music is not provided by any definite emotions, that music’s “only sub­
ject-matter is infinity”, becomes quite believable when it is stripped of its usual 
metaphysical pretensions, of [...] the Schopenhauerian Will, and seen in the 
context of the emotion-mood distinction’.36
Hermeneutics, according to Berger, is interpretation (employing meta­
phor and metonym) and its justification referring to persuasion or validity.
32 Berger, A Theory of Art, 202.
33 Ibid., 206.
34 Ibid., 208.
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As interpreters, we have at our disposal only metaphors and metonyms. It is 
an illusion, Berger asserts, that in interpretation one can do without meta­
phor, that there exists something like the ‘literal description’ of a work (this is 
usually associated with the analysis of the notation of a score according to 
arbitrary criteria for its reduction). Musical analysis, if it is at all to grasp the 
way in which tonal phenomena are ordered over time, must be metaphoric. In 
Berger’s opinion, modern analytical strategies making use of the notion of the 
series or the mathematical set and focused on the abstractly treated notation 
of pitch classes were created so as to neutralise criticism and eliminate the 
value system.
According to Berger, the meaning of a work is created by the interpreter in 
the same way that every scientific theory is formed: through the formulation 
and verification of hypotheses. Thus he distinguishes two competing interpre- 
tational approaches: (l) the fundamentalist approach, based on validity, and
(2) the pragmatic approach, employing persuasion. In his opinion, an inter­
pretation can only be valid (i.e. true or false) on the level of social praxis, 
whilst the interpretation of musical works can be only more or less persuasive 
(in respect to the arguments put forward).
So in Berger’s conception, the nature of the musical work (understood as 
an ordered sensory phenomenon interpreted within a given culture) is condi­
tioned by ‘biology and culture’, that is, by our universal cognitive mechanisms 
(limiting the distinguishing of the compositional means employed) and the 
aims motivating composers to undertake creative activity (within the social 
practices in existence within a given culture). This is because the history of 
music -  in Berger’s opinion -  consists of individual actions within the frame­
work of social practices and the change -  noticeable, with hindsight -  of crea­
tive goals and the artistic means connected with them.
The interpretation of the changes in modern 
music as seen by Berger
The theory of music history presented by Berger breaks with the 
modern concept of the evolution of ‘musical material’ and the concept of the 
‘historical necessity’37 of changes in compositional means. He also rejects the 
ideology of progress in art. The history of music is understood as the manifesta­
tion of individual actions within the framework of social practices interpreted 
from the point of view of the transformation of aims and means. In Berger’s 
opinion, it is aims which determine compositional means and not the other way 
around. Music history based on the positivist paradigm, meanwhile, focussed
37 See Isaiah Berlin, ‘Historical Inevitability’, in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, 1969).
on compositional means and ignored the aims and the ideological and social 
contexts of composed works. In his opinion, the historian should take into ac­
count both the means used by those composers who achieve specific aims and 
also the institutions which enable those aims to be achieved. According to Ber­
ger, there is some sense in characterising aims without speaking of means, but 
not in characterising means without speaking of aims.
The basic categories serving such a methodological approach are six ideal 
types: music that is autonomous, functional, mimetic, abstract, artistic or 
popular. Of course, the greater part of composed music falls ‘between’ these 
types. The notion of ‘art music’ and ‘popular music’ refer to Heinrich Bes- 
seler’s distinction between the ‘music of presentation’ (Darbietungsmusik) 
and the ‘music of participation’ (Umgangsmusik),38 but in Berger’s theory 
they function as heuristically useful ideal types, since they are understood as 
different social practices: ‘art music’ is connected with the practice of the con­
cert, with a clear division into the musicians, on one side, and the listeners, 
often immersed in ‘pious contemplation’, on the other; ‘popular music’, 
meanwhile, refers to the practice of joint music-making. In Berger’s concep­
tion, the term ‘mimetic music’ is associated with the art of the performer and 
a passive mode of reception, whereas ‘abstract music’ refers to the refined art 
of the composer (which seems to demand an active, attentive mode of recep­
tion). Berger shows that the natural, usual way in which music exists is its 
popular form, as opposed to its artistic form, which is always susceptible to 
doubts and requires justification.
The history of music is seen from the perspective of two ancient ideas 
which speak of its aims: ‘the idea of music as the sounding embodiment of the 
intelligible harmony of simple numerical ratios, the same harmony embodied 
in the structure of the cosmos, and the idea of music as capable of stirring 
human passions and forming character’,39 in Berger’s theory, they are associ­
ated with the notion of abstract music (as the ‘embodiment’ of the harmony of 
the world, of the philosophical Absolute or of ‘pure form’) and mimetic music 
(as the ‘embodiment’ of human feelings and moods). Berger traces the shift­
ing configuration of these basic aims and points to the causes of their 
changes. The fundamental aim of compositional work from the end of the 
thirteenth century to the beginning of the sixteenth century was the aspira­
tion to perfect harmony. This did not preclude, of course, the composing of 
works with a huge power for expressing fervent prayer or ecstatic contempla­
tion, yet their representation -  according to Berger -  was not the fundamen­
tal aim of creative work. Subsequently, the relations between these two an­
cient ideas changed. From the mid sixteenth century to the beginning of the
38 Heinrich Besseler, Das musikalische Hören der Neuzeit (Berlin, 1959)
39 Berger, A Theory ofArt, 121.
eighteenth century, the second of the ancient ideas of music began to be 
treated more seriously, although the idea of music as the embodiment of the 
harmony of the world was still retained. The new compositional practice and 
means served two competing aims: the embodiment of harmony associated 
with numerical ratios, and the musical representation of feelings. But towards 
the end of the eighteenth century the idea of music as a mimetic art capable of 
imitating feelings became dominant. Berger points to two causes of this reor­
ganisation of compositional aims and means. He considers that empirical 
research in the field of acoustics and discussion on temperament diminished 
the credibility of the idea of cosmic harmony, and the humanistic reverence 
for ancient ideas and practices assured music of an alternative ‘ethical power’ 
based on its inferiority to words. Thus the Aristotelian idea (mimesis) was the 
ground on which music could be compared with poetry and numbered among 
the fine arts. European musical culture of the eighteenth century favoured the 
mimetic and popular aspects of the new paradigm. At the forefront was opera, 
with its often dilettantish devotees, and the abstract legacy of ars poetica lost 
its central position.
What triggered a further change in the relations between these two aims 
of music was the appearance of the German ‘metaphysics of instrumental 
music’. In Berger’s opinion, abstract music again became important, because 
a substitute for cosmic harmony was found, namely the philosophical Abso­
lute, guaranteeing the standing and significance of ‘abstract music’ -  a substi­
tute which Arthur Schopenhauer identified with the ‘thing in itself and de­
fined as Will. The metaphysics of music became the new religion, with the 
theory of artistic autonomy as its theology. Thus during the nineteenth cen­
tury there coexisted two aims of composition determining two musical cul­
tures: the idea of mimetic music and the Italian-French operatic culture based 
upon it, and the idea of absolute music and the Austrian-German culture of 
symphonic music which it informed. Up until World War One, the idea of 
imitation held its own, yet the idea of abstract music ‘shone with a new avant- 
garde light’: music was to be the embodiment of ‘pure form’. In the inter-war 
years, it was the idea of abstract music referring to classical proportion that 
was preferred and favoured, at the expense of mimetic music, whilst after 
World War Two there set in -  as Berger puts it -  a cold war between ‘social­
ist-realist mimesis’ and the ‘avant-garde abstract’. Avant-garde critics dis­
dainfully rejected the idea of imitation, which became almost exclusively the 
domain of popular music. In the mid twentieth century, only song and film 
music could be mimetic without losing face. Yet avant-garde abstract music, 
alluding to ‘pure form’, was deprived of its fundamental justification -  meta­
physical value. During recent decades, the politically conditioned ‘cold war’ 
between avant-garde abstraction and socrealist mimesis has lost its argu­
ments, and the need for art with a metaphysical grounding has appeared.
Thus Berger proposes a new look at the history of music, accentuating on 
one hand the change of compositional and performance aims and means and 
on the other the stability of the aims of composed music, a stability linked to 
the supra-historical treatment of ‘human nature’, that is, the need to manifest 
human feelings and moods in the composed ‘auditive phenomena’, and also 
the ambition that they be realised according to abstract, refined and elaborate 
principles, referring to universal laws.
Art has -  according to Berger -  two general functions: (1) to educate and 
provide extra-aesthetic pleasure (in this case, we must consider the work in 
the context of life) and (2) to provide aesthetic pleasure, constituting the har­
mony of our cognitive faculties: imagination and intellect (in this case, we 
must consider the work in the context of other works). Art teaches us to listen 
and to communicate with others, and so it is a chief tool of multiculturalism, 
but -  so Berger opines -  not all cultures and works have the same value. We 
are consigned to choice, and so we must have some basic point of reference. 
Berger admits that he is fond of a vision in which art is capable of represent­
ing our most profound needs and cares and imparting to them an elaborate, 
sensuous form that arouses delight. He considers that contemporary artists 
fulfil this mission relatively rarely, and so the task of criticism should be to 
isolate those rare cases and ‘glorify’ them, just as the task of the critical histo­
rian is cogent interpretation.
Berger’s theory, rejecting the positivist paradigm of learning about music, 
undoubtedly provokes principled discussion of the methodology of musico- 
logical study and the possibility of an integral approach to the phenomenon of 
man’s creative activity within the context of universal biological conditioning 
and variable philosophical conceptions, and also the aims of social practices 
and the artistic means subordinated to them.
Translated by John Comber
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